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Optical homodyne detection has been widely used in continuous-variable (CV) quantum infor-
mation processing for measuring field quadrature values. In this paper we explore the possibility
of operating a conjugate homodyne detection system in “photon counting” mode to implement
discrete-variable (DV) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. A conjugate homodyne detec-
tion system, which consists of a beam splitter followed by two optical homodyne detectors, can
simultaneously measure a pair of conjugate quadratures X and P of the incoming quantum state.
In classical electrodynamics, X2 + P 2 is proportional to the energy (the photon number) of the
input light. In quantum optics, X and P do not commute and thus the above photon-number mea-
surement is intrinsically noisy. This suggests that a blind application of the standard security proof
could result pessimistic QKD performance. We overcome this obstacle by taking advantage of two
special features of the proposed detection scheme. First, the fundamental detection noise associ-
ated with vacuum fluctuation cannot be manipulated by an external adversary. Second, the ability
to reconstruct the photon number statistics at the receiver’s end can place additional constraints
on possible attacks from the adversary. As an example, we study the security of the BB84 QKD
using conjugate homodyne detection and evaluate its performance through numerical simulations.
This study may open the door to a new family of QKD protocols, in complementary to the well-
established DV-QKD based on single photon detection and CV-QKD based on coherent detection.
a
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has drawn great at-
tention for the potential to revolutionize cryptography
[1–6]. Presently, the two most well-established families
of QKD protocols are discrete-variable (DV) QKD us-
ing single photon detection [7, 8] and continuous-variable
(CV) QKD using coherent detection (optical homodyne
detection) [9–11]. For simplicity, in this paper we refer
them as DV-QKD and CV-QKD correspondingly.
On one hand, DV-QKD protocols, such as the cel-
ebrated BB84 QKD [7], have been demonstrated over
longer distances [12, 13], and enjoy the more mature se-
curity proofs especially when system imperfections and fi-
nite date size effects are taken into account. On the other
hand, CV-QKD protocols, especially the ones based on
coherent states [14], have their own advantages, such as
implementable using standard telecommunication com-
ponents and potential high key rate at short distances.
∗ qib1@ornl.gov
a This manuscript has been authored in part by UT-Battelle, LLC,
under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the US Department of
Energy (DOE). The US government retains and the publisher, by
accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the US
government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, world-
wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this
manuscript, or allow others to do so, for US government pur-
poses. DOE will provide public access to these results of federally
sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access
Plan (http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan).
Note that most distinguishing features of CV-QKD can
be contributed to optical homodyne detector, which can
be implemented with highly efficient photodiodes work-
ing at room-temperature. State-of-the-art optical homo-
dyne detector can be operated above tens of GHz with
negligible dead-time and a pathway towards fully inte-
grated, on-chip, photonic implementation [15]. In addi-
tion, the intrinsic filtering provided by the local oscillator
in optical homodyne detection can effectively suppress
background noise and enable QKD through conventional
dense wavelength division multiplexed fiber networks in
the presence of strong classical traffic [16–18] and through
daytime free-space channels [19]. A natural question to
ask is: can we implement DV-QKD protocols using op-
tical homodyne detection? If possible, it may inherit
certain advantages from both worlds. In this paper, we
address the above question by studying the BB84 QKD
using conjugate optical homodyne detector operated in
“photon counting” mode.
A conjugate homodyne detection system, which con-
sists of a beam splitter followed by two optical homodyne
detectors, can simultaneously measure a pair of conjugate
quadratures X and P of the incoming quantum state by
maintaining a 90o phase offset between the two corre-
sponding local oscillators. In classical electrodynamics,
X2 +P 2 is proportional to the energy (the photon num-
ber) of the input light. In quantum optics, X and P do
not commute and thus cannot be determined simultane-
ously and noiselessly due to Heisenbergs uncertainty prin-
ciple. This suggests that the above conjugate homodyne
detection is intrinsically noisy when operated in photon-
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2counting mode. Intuitively, noisy detectors would result
poor QKD performance if the standard security analy-
sis is employed. To overcome this hurdle, we develop
a new security analysis technique exploring two special
features of the proposed detection scheme. First, the fun-
damental detection noise associated with vacuum fluctu-
ation cannot be manipulated by an external adversary
(Eve), so it is not necessary to contribute the detector
noise to Eve’s attack when we estimate a lower bound
of Eve’s information. This is in line with the trusted
detector noise model in CV-QKD [11, 20]. Second, the
proposed detection scheme allows the legitimate receiver
to reconstruct the photon number statistics of the re-
ceived light and thus place additional constraints on the
possible attacks from Eve. This is similar to the detector
decoy QKD, where the photon number statistics at the
receiver’s end is used to improve QKD performance [21].
As we will show later, by utilizing these two features,
a tighter bound on Eve’s information and an improved
secure key rate can be achieved.
We remark that unlike CV-QKD based on phase-
sensitive coherent detection, where sophisticated carrier
phase recovery scheme may be required to establish a
common phase reference between the transmitter (Alice)
and the receiver (Bob) [22, 23], the conjugate homodyne
detection scheme adopted in this paper is intrinsically
phase insensitive and no phase reference is required.
This paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we will
review the theory of photon counting using optical homo-
dyne detection [24, 25], and present two possible ways of
applying this detection scheme in the BB84 QKD. In Sec.
III, we develop a new security analysis method taking
into account the special features of the proposed detec-
tion scheme, and conduct numerical simulations to eval-
uate the secure key rates. In Sec. IV, we discuss some
practical issues.
II. THE BB84 QKD USING CONJUGATE
HOMODYNE DETECTION
A. Conjugate homodyne detection in photon
counting mode
Characterizing photon number statistics using optical
homodyne detection has been investigated in [24, 25].
Here we follow the discussion in [25]. The basic setup
of a conjugate homodyne detection system is shown in
Fig. 1. We assume that an unknown quantum state is
input from port 1 of a symmetric beam splitter (BS1 in
Fig. 1) and vacuum state is coupled to the other input
port. Two optical homodyne detectors are employed to
measure the field quadratures of the two output modes.
The phase difference between the two corresponding local
oscillators is fixed at 90o. In this paper, we assume all
the optical homodyne detectors are perfect (noiseless and
lossless). We further assume that the unknown input
state is in the same mode as the local oscillators.
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FIG. 1: Conjugate optical homodyne detection. BS1−4:
symmetric beam splitter; BD1−2: balanced
photodetector; LO: local oscillator.
Given the two local oscillators are sufficiently strong,
the outputs of the two homodyne detectors are quadra-
ture components of mode 3 and mode 4 (X3 and P4). In
[25], a new observable Z = X23 + P
2
4 is defined. Given
an input state described by the density matrix ρ, the
probability density function of Z is given by [25]
PZ(z) = e
−z
∞∑
n=0
ρnn
n!
zn, (1)
where ρnn are the diagonal terms of ρ in the Fock basis
and z ≥ 0.
Note that PZ(z) only dependents on the diagonal terms
of the density matrix of ρ, as expected from a “phase-
insensitive” photon detector. Given a large sample size,
the photon number distribution Pn = ρnn of the input
state can be reconstructed from experimentally deter-
mined PZ(z), as shown in [25].
In the case of single-shot measurement, given the input
state is a Fock state |n〉, the likelihood of a measurement
output of z can be determined from Eq. (1) [25]
PZ(z|n) = e−z z
n
n!
. (2)
In the BB84 QKD, threshold single photon detector
(SPD), which can discriminate vacuum state from non-
vacuum states but cannot resolve photon number, is com-
monly applied. Two important parameters of a thresh-
old SPD are single-photon detection efficiency and dark
count probability. The detection efficiency ηD is defined
as the conditional probability that the detector clicks
given the input is single-photon state, and the dark count
probability υD is defined as the conditional probability
that the detector clicks given the input is vacuum state.
To operate a conjugate homodyne detector in the
threshold photon counting mode, we need to map the
continuous measurement result z to one of the two pos-
sible detection events {click, no-click}. Here, we adopt
the same strategy as in [25]: if z is smaller (larger) than
3a pre-defined threshold value τ ∈ [0,∞), the detector
output is assigned as click (non-click).
Using Eq. (2), the detection efficiency ηD and the dark
count probability υD can be determined by
ηD =
∫ ∞
τ
PZ(z|1)dz = e−τ (τ + 1) (3)
υD =
∫ ∞
τ
PZ(z|0)dz = e−τ . (4)
In Fig. 2, we present ηD and υD as functions of the
threshold value τ . By choosing an appropriate τ , we
could achieve either a high detection efficiency or a low
dark count probability, but not both at the same time.
For example, when the detection efficiency ηD is 0.1, the
corresponding dark count probability υD is about 0.02.
As a comparison, a state-of-the-art SPD can have a de-
tection efficiency above 0.5 and at the same time, a dark
count probability below 10−7 per ns [26].
FIG. 2: Simulation results. Detection efficiency ηD
(black solid line) and dark count probability υD (red
dashed line) as functions of threshold τ .
At the first sight, the inferior performance of conju-
gate homodyne detection in photon counting mode seems
limit its applications in single-photon based QKD, such
as the BB84 protocol. This is probably true if we ap-
ply the standard security proof where all the detection
noises are contributed to Eve’s attack. Such a conser-
vative assumption is necessary when the origins of the
noises cannot be identified.
In our case, the measurement uncertainty of the conju-
gate homodyne detector is due to fundamental quantum
noise rather than technical imperfections. So it is not
necessary to contribute this noise to Eve’s attack when
we estimate a lower bound of Eve’s information. In next
section, we will present an improved security analysis tak-
ing into account the special features of the proposed de-
tection scheme. Below we first discuss two different ways
of using a pair of conjugate homodyne detector in the
BB84 QKD protocol.
We consider polarization encoding BB84 QKD using
perfect single photon source. For each transmission, Al-
ice prepares a single photon pulse with a polarization
randomly chosen from {H, V, D, A}, and sends it to Bob
through an insecure quantum channel. Here H (V) refers
to horizontal (vertical) polarization state and represents
bit 0 (bit 1) in the rectilinear basis, while D (A) repre-
sents 45o (135o) polarization state and represents bit 0
(bit 1) in the diagonal basis. At Bob’s end, he randomly
switches between the two measurement bases and mea-
sures the incoming photon using two sets of conjugate
homodye detection systems (D0 and D1). To determine a
bit value from the outputs of D0 and D1, we consider two
possible operation modes: independent detection mode
and differential detection mode.
B. Independent detection mode
In this mode, D0 and D1 are operated independently
as two threshold photon detectors, with detection effi-
ciency and dark count probability given by Eqs. (3) and
(4). Due to the symmetry of the protocol, we assume
both detectors use the same threshold value τ . There
are four possible detection outputs: both detectors click
(double-click), only the correct detector clicks, only the
wrong detector clicks, and none of them click. The cor-
responding probabilities are represented by PD, PC , PW ,
and PN .
To give an rough estimation of the potential key rate,
we calculate the mutual information IAB under the as-
sumption that there is no technical imperfections except
the channel loss. Note IAB is not the secure key rate,
since we do not consider information could be gained by
Eve. Nevertheless, it can serve as a rough upper bound
on the secure key rate. We will study lower bounds of
secure key rate in next Section.
Given Alice’s single photon is prepared in an ideal
quantum state corresponding to bit 0, the probability
that D0 clicks is
P
(0)
D0 = ηch
∫ ∞
τ
PZ(z|1)dz + (1− ηch)
∫ ∞
τ
PZ(z|0)dz
= (ηchτ + 1)e
−τ ,
(5)
where ηch is the channel transmittance.
The probability that D1 clicks is simply the dark count
probability given by Eq. (4)
P
(0)
D1 = e
−τ . (6)
Since the dark count of D1 is independent of the output
of D0, the probabilities of the four detection events can
be determined from Eqs (5) and (6) as
PN = (1−P (0)D0 )(1−P (0)D1 ) = [1− (ηchτ + 1)e−τ ](1− e−τ )
(7)
4PC = P
(0)
D0 (1− P (0)D1 ) = (ηchτ + 1)e−τ (1− e−τ ) (8)
PW = (1− P (0)D0 )P (0)D1 = [1− (ηchτ + 1)e−τ ]e−τ (9)
PD = P
(0)
D0P
(0)
D1 = (ηchτ + 1)e
−2τ . (10)
We assume that Bob post-selects the single photon de-
tection events and throws away no-click and double-click
events. The corresponding gain Q and quantum bit error
rate (QBER) E are given by
Q = PC + PW = (ηchτ + 2)e
−τ − 2(ηchτ + 1)e−2τ (11)
E =
PW
Q
=
e−τ − (ηchτ + 1)e−2τ
Q
. (12)
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is
given by
IAB = Q[1−H2(E)], (13)
where H2(x) = −xlog2(x) − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) is the
Shannon entropy.
In this paper we assume the quantum channel is stan-
dard optical fiber with an attenuation coefficient of γ =
0.2dB/km. The channel transmittance is given by
ηch = 10
−γL
10 , (14)
where L is the fiber length in kilometers.
Figure 3 shows the simulation results of IAB as a func-
tion of fiber length. In this simulation, the threshold
value τ is optimized to maximize IAB .
C. Differential detection mode
In this mode, the continuous outputs z0 and z1 of D0
and D1 are used jointly to determined the bit value. More
specifically, Bob assigns the bit value to 0 (1) if z0 > z1
(z1 > z0). Here, we assume that the probability of z0 =
z1 is negligible. Note in this mode, Bob acquires a bit
value for every incoming signal, so the gain Q is one.
Given Alice sends bit 0 and the channel transmittance
is ηch, with a probability of 1−ηch, both detectors receive
vacuum state. In this case, the error probability (i.e.,
the probability that z0 < z1) is simply 1/2. With a
probability of ηch, D0 receives one photon and D1 receives
vacuum. In this case, the error probability is given by∫∞
0
P (z0|1){
∫∞
z0
PZ(z1|0)dz1}dz0 = 1/4, so the average
error rate is
E = ηch
1
4
+ (1− ηch)1
2
=
1
2
− ηch
4
. (15)
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FIG. 3: The mutual information IAB in three cases:
perfect SPDs (red solid line), independent detection
mode (black dashed line), and differential detection
mode (blue solid line).
Again, IAB can be calculated from Eq. (13) and the
result is shown in Fig. 3. As a comparison, in Fig. 3, we
also present the case when perfect SPDs are employed.
In that case IAB = ηch.
As shown in Fig. 3, IAB determined from the two de-
tection modes are very close to each other. At short dis-
tances, both of them are about one order of magnitude
below the one achievable with perfect SPDs. Further-
more both of them scale poorer with channel loss. While
this may look pessimistic at the first sight, we remark
that an optical homodyne detector could be operated at
a much higher detection rate than a SPD. So our pro-
posed scheme could still be a viable solution at short
distances. We will discuss this issue more in Sec. IV.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Standard security analysis
We first calculate secure key rate using the standard
security proof of the BB84 implemented with a perfect
single photon source. The asymptotic secure key rate is
given by [27]
R = Q[1− 2H2(E)]. (16)
Here we assume the efficient BB84 QKD protocol [28]
is adopted, that Alice and Bob chose one basis more often
than the other (in the asymptotic case the probability of
choosing the preferred basis, the rectilinear basis in this
paper, approaches to one).
From Eq. (16), to achieve a positive key rate, E has
to be less than 11%. This suggests that the differential
detection mode cannot work, since the minimum error
rate is 25% according to Eq. (15). So we only consider
the independent detection mode.
5FIG. 4: Secure key rates using the standard security
proof [27]. Black line: independent detection mode; red
line: perfect SPDs.
Note Eq. (16) is based on the assumption that the
quantum state received by Bob is ether vacuum or single
photon state. However, in practice Eve may intercept
Alice’s photons and send arbitrary quantum state to Bob,
so Eq. (16) cannot be directly applied. Fortunately, a
detector squashing model exists in the BB84 QKD [29],
which states that as long as the double-click events are
kept and assigned with random bit values, Eq. (16) still
can be applied. In this case, Q and E can be determined
from Eqs. (7)-(10) as
Q = 1− PN = (ηchτ + 2)e−τ − (ηchτ + 1)e−2τ (17)
E =
PW + 0.5PD
Q
=
e−τ − 0.5(ηchτ + 1)e−2τ
Q
. (18)
We conduct numerical simulation and the asymptotic
secure key rate is shown in Fig. 4. In this simulation,
the threshold value τ is optimized to maximize the secure
key rate. As a comparison, we also present the secure
key rate for the efficient BB84 using perfect SPDs, which
is simply R = ηch. From Fig. 4, both the secure key
rate and the QKD distance of the new detection scheme
are very limited. To improve the QKD performance, we
develop a new security analysis below.
B. Improved security analysis
We improve the secure key rate by taking advantages
of two special features of the proposed detection scheme:
the quantum origin of the detection noise and the ability
of reconstructing the photon number statistics.
We define the joint probability that Alice transmits
m photons and Bob receives n photons as Pm,n, where
m and n are nonnegative integers. The corresponding
yield (conditional detection probability) and QBER are
defined as Ym,n and Em,n. Since we assume that a perfect
single photon source is employed, the only nonzero terms
are P1,n, Y1,n and E1,n. As we have shown in [25], given
a large sample size, the photon number statistics of the
received quantum state can be fully recovered from the
outputs of the detectors. So we assume that the terms
P1,n can be fully determined by Bob.
We define the gain of the n-photon state as
Q1,n = P1,nY1,n, (19)
where the n-photon state is defined at the receiver’s end.
Note this is different from the definition in decoy state
QKD [30–32], where the n-photon state is commonly de-
fined at Alice’s end.
The overall gain Q and the overall QBER E are defined
as
Q =
∞∑
n=0
Q1,n (20)
E =
∑∞
n=0Q1,nE1,n
Q
. (21)
To determine the secure key rate, we consider the re-
verse reconciliation in the classical post processing stage
[11], where Bob sends correction information to Alice,
who corrects her raw key to have the same values as
Bob’s. There are three different cases based on the pho-
ton number received by Bob:
Case one: Bob receives a vacuum state
In the case, both Alice and Eve have no information
about Bob’s detection results. No secure key can be gen-
erated and there is no need to perform privacy amplifi-
cation.
Case two: Bob receives one photon
In this case the standard security proof can be applied.
Note there is no need to summon to the detector squash-
ing model [29] since Bob receives a qubit.
If Bob could measure the received photon with perfect
SPDs, then the QBER in the rectilinear basis can be used
to quantify the cost of error correction, while the QBER
in the diagonal basis EX can be used to upper bound
Eve’s information thus the cost for privacy amplification.
However the detection scheme proposed in this paper is
intrinsic noisy. Due to the detector noise, both the mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob IAB and Eve’s
information on Bob’s detection results are smaller than
the case when perfect SPDs are employed. The IAB term
(and the cost for error correction) can be properly quan-
tified by using the actual QBER measured with the noisy
detector. As a conservative estimation of Eve’s informa-
tion, here we still use EX to quantify the cost of privacy
amplification. We remark that by further quantifying the
decrease of Eve’s information due to the detector noise,
the secure key rate could be further improved.
Case three: Bob receives more than one photon
6The detector responses to multi-photon signals are
more complicated and Eve might be able to introduce
basis-dependent detection efficiency by sending tailored
multi-photon signals. For simplicity, we assume all the
multi-photon signals received by Bob are not secure and
cannot be used to generate secure key. Again we remark
that by developing a more sophisticated detector model,
the secure key rate could be further improved in the case
when a practical light source (rather than a perfect single
photon source) is employed.
Combined the above three cases, the secure key rate is
given by
R = Q1,0 +Q1,1[1−H2(EX)]−QH2(E), (22)
where Q1,0 represents the contribution from vacuum
state, similar to the case in decoy state QKD [33]. Note
that EX is the expected QBER in the diagonal basis if
perfect SPDs are applied. An upper bound of EX can be
obtained from measurable parameters, as we will show
below.
Secure key rate: independent detection mode
To apply Eq. (22) to calculate secure key rate, we need
to determine five parameters: Q1,0, Q1,1, Q, EX and E.
SinceQ and E can be determined from experimental data
directly, below we discuss how to determine the rest.
To determine Q1,0 = P1,0Y1,0, we need to determine
Y1,0, the probability that Bob has an effective detection
event given he receives a vacuum state. As we noted
early, since the photon number statistics at Bob’s end is
available, we do not need to call for the detector squash-
ing model and can simply throw away all the no-click and
double-click events. Using Eq. (2), we have
Y1,0 = 2
∫ τ
0
PZ(z0|0)dz0 ×
∫ ∞
τ
PZ(z1|0)dz1
= 2(1− e−τ )e−τ .
(23)
The corresponding QBER is
E1,0 = 0.5. (24)
Similarly, to determineQ1,1, we only need to determine
Y1,1, the probability that Bob has an effective detection
given he receives one photon. Under the assumption that
the two detector D0 and D1 are identical, Y1,1 is inde-
pendent of the polarization state of the received photon,
and can be determined by
Y1,1 =
∫ τ
0
PZ(z0|1)dz0 ×
∫ ∞
τ
PZ(z1|0)dz1
+
∫ ∞
τ
PZ(z0|1)dz0 ×
∫ τ
0
PZ(z1|0)dz1
= (τ + 2)e−τ − 2(τ + 1)e−2τ .
(25)
The corresponding QBER is
E1,1 = (1− EX)
∫ τ
0
PZ(z0|1)dz0 ×
∫∞
τ
PZ(z1|0)dz1
Y1,1
+ EX
∫ τ
0
PZ(z0|0)dz0 ×
∫∞
τ
PZ(z1|1)dz1
Y1,1
=
(EXτ + 1)e
−τ − (τ + 1)e−2τ
Y1,1
.
(26)
Using Eq. (21), we have
QE = Q1,0E1,0 +Q1,1E1,1 +
∞∑
n=2
Q1,nE1,n
≥ Q1,0E1,0 +Q1,1E1,1,
(27)
which leads to an upper bound of E1,1
E1,1 ≤ E(u)1,1 =
QE −Q1,0E1,0
Q1,1
. (28)
Once an upper bound of E1,1 has been obtained from
Eq. (28), an upper bound of EX can be determined by
using Eq. (26). By now, all the parameters needed in
Eq. (22) have been derived.
To evaluate the QKD performance, we calculate the
secure key rate under normal condition without Eve’s
attack. Since we assume a perfect single photon source is
employed, for a pure loss channel, Bob either receives vac-
uum state or single-photon state, with the corresponding
probabilities P1,0 = 1 − ηch and P1,1 = ηch. All the
other probabilities P1,n = 0 for n ≥ 2. We further as-
sume that the QBER due to polarization misalignment
is Ed. Using the above photon number distribution, it is
easy to show that Q1,0 = (1 − ηch)Y1,0, Q1,1 = ηchY1,1,
Q = Q1,0 + Q1,1, E =
0.5Q1,0+Q1,1E1,1
Q , and EX = Ed,
where Y1,0, Y1,1, and E1,1 are given in Eqs. (23), (25)
and (26).
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 5. In this sim-
ulation, the threshold value τ is optimized to maximize
the secure key rate. As a comparison, we also present the
secure key rate for the BB84 QKD implemented with per-
fect SPDs. Comparing with the results shown in Fig. 4,
we can see that the QKD performance has been greatly
improved.
Secure key rate: differential detection mode
The analysis in the differential detection mode is sim-
ilar to that in the independent detection mode but with
a few modifications.
First, in this mode, Bob’s detector works in a deter-
ministic fashion, meaning for each incoming signal Bob’s
detector will output either bit 0 or bit 1. This suggests
that Y1,n = 1 for any n. So Q1,n = P1,n and Q = 1.
7Ed=0.001
Ed=0.01
Ed=0
FIG. 5: Secure key rates using the improved security
proof (independent detection mode). Black lines:
proposed scheme with Ed = 0, 0.001, 0.01; red line:
perfect SPDs with Ed = 0.
Second, E1,0 is still 0.5, but E1,1 is given by
E1,1 = (1− EX)
∫ ∞
0
PZ(z0|1){
∫ ∞
z0
PZ(z1|0)dz1}dz0
+ EX
∫ ∞
0
PZ(z0|0){
∫ ∞
z0
PZ(z1|1)dz1}dz0
=
1
4
+
EX
2
.
(29)
Again, an upper bound of E1,1 can be determined from
experimental data by using Eq. (28), then an upper
bound of EX can be obtained by using Eq. (29).
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 6. Comparing
with the results shown in Fig. 5, we can see that while
both detection modes yield similar key rate in the ideal
(noiseless) case, the independent detection mode is more
robust against technical imperfection.
IV. DISCUSSION
As shown in Figs. 5 and 6, the performance of the
proposed scheme is inferior in compare with the BB84
implemented with conventional SPDs. More specifically,
at short distances, the secure key rate of the proposed
scheme is about one order of magnitude lower than the
conventional approach, and it scales worse with the dis-
tance. One may wonder whether the proposed scheme
could be a viable solution in practice. Our answer is
threefold:
First, in the simulations presented in this paper, both
the optical homodyne detectors and SPDs are assumed
to be perfect: lossless and noiseless. In practice, the
detection efficiency of an optical homodyne detector is
typically higher than that of a SPD. This suggests that in
Ed=0Ed=0.001
Ed=0.01
FIG. 6: Secure key rates using the improved security
proof (differential detection mode). Black lines:
proposed scheme with Ed = 0, 0.001, 0.01; red line:
perfect SPDs with Ed = 0.
real-life applications, the gap between the two approaches
may be smaller than that shown in Figs. 5 and 6.
Second, in this paper the secure key rate is quantified
using bits per transmission. In practice, the secure key
rate quantified using bits per second is more relevant.
Limited by its dead time, the maximum detection rate of
a practical SPD is typically below 100MHz. This places a
constrain on the achievable secure key rate of the BB84
QKD implemented with this type of detector. On the
contrary, an optical homodyne detector shows negligible
dead time. This suggests that the proposed scheme could
be operated at a much higher rate than the conventional
scheme based on SPDs, and may provide a comparable or
even higher secure key rate in bits per second over short
distances.
Third, as in the case of CV-QKD, the proposed detec-
tion scheme can be operated at room temperature, and is
highly integratable and robust against broadband back-
ground noise. In fact, our scheme is even simpler than
the coherent detection scheme used in CV-QKD, since
there is no need to establish phase reference between Al-
ice and Bob. To detect Alice’s photon efficiently, Bob’s
local oscillators should be in the same mode as Alice’s
photon. This requirement is relatively easy to be sat-
isfied and has been routinely demonstrated in the so-
called measurement-device-independent QKD [34] with
commercial off-the-shelf lasers.
To apply the proposed scheme in practice, there are
several challenges to be overcome. First, the present
study is based on a perfect single photon source. Un-
fortunately, such a source is not available in practice.
Most of the BB84 QKD implementations are based on
phase randomized weak laser sources, which can gener-
ate more than one photons occasionally and are suscepti-
ble to photon-number splitting attack [35]. Fortunately,
in conventional BB84, this problem has been solved by
8introducing the so-called decoy state protocols [30–32],
where by randomly changing the intensity of the weak
laser pulses generated by Alice, the detection statistics
of photon number states can be estimated. We expect
that the decoy state idea can also be incorporated into
the proposed scheme when implemented with a practical
laser source. Second, we have ignored the technical im-
perfections of optical homodyne detectors, including the
non-unity detection efficiency and electronic noise. Those
imperfections need to be quantified and taken into ac-
count in the security analysis. Finally, in this paper we
only consider asymptotic cases where all the QKD pa-
rameters can be determined precisely. It is important to
further investigate the case with finite data size.
In summary, we explore the possibility of operating
optical homodyne detectors in photon counting mode to
implement DV-QKD protocols. By developing a new se-
curity analysis based on the special features of the de-
tector, we show that reasonable secure key rates could
be achieved. This study may open the door to a new
family of QKD protocols, in complementary to the well-
established DV-QKD based on single photon detection
and CV-QKD based on coherent detection.
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